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I begin with some interesting statistical information just
published by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts relating to criminal appeals in the Second Circuit.

For

the fiscal year ending in 1988, we terminated 529 criminal
appeals, constituting about 18% of our total number of all cases
terminated.

In 1988, 291 cases were terminated on the merits.

Of these, 234 were affirmed, 31 reversed and the remainder
terminated by dismissal, remand or other non-merit disposition.
The reversal rate for convictions in 1988 was 10.8%, up over 21/2% percentage points from the 8.1% reversal rate in 1987.

This

is not necessarily to be taken by the defense bar as a source of
great encouragement.

In any event, our median time for

disposition, counting from the filing of the notice of appeal in
a criminal . ~ase, is 6 months, the fastest in the nation.

If you

can't get a reversal, you can at least get a rapid decision.
The last item in your coursebook is my outline on Federal
Criminal Appellate Practice in the Second Circuit.

The outline

covers the subject of appealability, beginning at page 227,
mechanics of appeals, beginning at page 232, scope of review,
beginning at page 239, appellate advocacy at 242 and
decisionmaking at 247.

I hope that the outline will be of use to

you in prosecuting criminal appeals in the second circuit.

As a

matter of my own

£-interest, I ask that you give special

attention to the section on appellate advocacy.

My colleagues

and I would very much appreciate a general improvement in the
quality of briefing as well as oral argument.

On the last page

of the outline, page 251, I have listed some suggested references
that may be helpful in preparing for the presentation of a
criminal appeal.
Due to time constraints and the rule that a good appellate
lawyer should limit argument to a few good points, I intend to
cover only two topics -- one touched upon in my outline and one
not covered in the materials at all.

The first is the importance

of making a proper record of evidentiary objections, and the
second is the use of 28 U.S.C.
post-conviction relief
process.

2255, the principal vehicle for

§

lowing the completion of the appellate

I hope to leave some time for questions and comments on

anything you may care to discuss relating to appeals and postconviction relief.
With respect to the admission of evidence, Rule 103(a)(l) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a timely objection or
motion to strike with the specific ground for objection stated on
the record, unless the specific ground is apparent from the
context.

Rule 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof in the case

of a ruling excluding evidence, unless the evidence to be offered
is apparent from the context.

Even if there is a proper
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objection or offer of proof, however, there is no error unless
substantial rights are affected.

Of course, Rule 103(d) provides

that an appellate court can take notice of plain errors that
affect substantial rights but are not brought to the attention of
the trial court.

This is the evidentiary counterpart of the

general rule that an error not objected to at trial will not be
considered on appeal unless it can be classified as "plain
error."
A recent case before a panel of my court involved an
appellant who was convicted after a jury trial for possessing and
distributing two vials of "crack."

On appeal, she contended that

the district court erred in allowing the government to cross
examine her about her general familiarity with cocaine.

In a

summary order, the panel rejected the contention, citing the
failure to object to the evidence, and holding that there was no
plain error in light of the district court's broad discretion in
evidentiary matters and the appellant's denial on direct
examination that she was a dealer in cocaine.

One can only

speculate what the result would have been if the objection were
properly made.
To summarize:

Admission or exclusion of evidence is not

error unless a party's substantial rights are affected and (1) a
specific objection is made in cases of admission and (2) an offer
of proof is made in cases of exclusion.
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Here are some actual

objections to the admission of evidence that are improper because
they lack the necessary specificity:
"He's getting close to that legal problem, your honor."
"That's unfair, your honor!"
"That's unfair, your honor and he knows it!"
"I've been listening to Mr. McNamara for half an hour, your
honor, and if he persists in testifying, I'll have no
alternative but to mark him and offer him in evidence."
"Incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial . . . and against
the interests of justice . . . and just no good."
"He's getting on dangerous ground, your honor."
"Objection, your honor.
improper."

Counsel knows that's totally

"Judge, could we get on with something that has to do with
this case?"
"Objection, your honor, that's highly unusual."
My favorite:

"Objection, your honor, that evidence is very
unfavorable to my client."

How about this actual question and objection?:
Question. When he went, had you gone and had she, if she
wanted to and were able, for the time being excluding
all the restraints on her not to go also, would he have
brought you meaning you and she with him to the station?
Mr. Brooks.
and shot.

Objection.

That question should be taken out

In some of those questions, of course, the specific ground
for objection may have been apparent from the context.
certainly was true of the last objection.
always avoid trouble by being specific.
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That

You can and should
Sometimes, a very brief

objection will do it:

objection -- irrelevant; objection --

privileged communication.

More often, some brief explanation of

the objection in plain language will comply with the Rule and
preserve the objection.

Here are some illustrations:

LEADtr-..d- Objection, your honor;
counsel is putting words in the
wit'.~ mouth. This is le:iding.
HEARSAY~ Objection, your honor/the
jury c:innot tell if someorn?/who
is not a witness was telling the
truth. This)~>~ca~say: /
BEST EvJDENCE...:,., ObJect10!J, your
honor, it's not fair for 0e defendant to talk about what is in that
letter and not let ~h"jury see it.
Not the best evide ce.
Christopher J. ivlunc , Chief Deputy District Attorney µ~ Denver, Colorado, is a lawyer who has developed
a whole series of plain language objec1
tions. Here are so e of his:

Objection. It's improper t ask a witness to agree
with yo r little theory or argument: ;You're supposed to ask
questions about the facts.
I RRELEYA~T- Objection. That has
nothing to do with the things this
j ry has to decide.
SPEC ATIVE- Objection. He's asking
the witness to guess. Witnesses arc
supposed to tell us what they
know, not speculate.
EARSAY- Objection. The witness
should only be asked what he
knows, not what somebody else
\
told him.
B~\ONDTHE ScorE- Objection. This is
\getting off the subject. It is
peyond the scope of direct and
~~olatcs Rule 611 (b ).
lNSUFFIClENT FccNDATION - Objection.
Without more background there
is nO'way to tell whether this is
reliable enough to even be considered, much less believed.
NMZRAl l\T- Objec~ion. He's a'.'iki n~
the witncs:i lo give a -;pccd1 inste:1d of :ins\vering questions. The
witness might accidentally say
things that arc'j\mproper and he
shouldn't be put in that position.

ARGUMENTATIVE

:\
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Much time, of course, is wasted in making objections that
take you nowhere, clutter up the record and serve no purpose.
Here are some examples of those:
(a)

"Self-serving" -- Hopefully, all evidence adduced by a

party serves the interests of that party.

By itself, the

objection means nothing.
(b)

"Calls for operation of witnesses mind's" -- It is our

fervent desire that the mind of a witness become operational in
response to any question.

There are cases where the state of

mind is the principal issue.
(c)

A non-responsive answer is a

"Non-responsive answer"

problem only for the questioner and I conclude my discussion of
evidentiary objections with some actual illustrations of nonresponsive answers.

Of course, the attorney asking the questions

is responsible for these non-responsive answers.

These questions

illustrate that a well-prepared witness, like a well-prepared
lawyer, is beautiful to behold but all too rare:
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now in session, and here are my favorite tra:nsqmp1s,
recorded by America's keepers of the word.
'. 'trt:msquips '' in this chapter of the book are copyrighted

hand Reporters Assodation, and are reprinted with their permission.]:
Q. Did you stay all night with this man in New, York?

),~··
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

•

I refuse to answer thatquestion.
Did you stay all night with this.· inan in Chicago?
I refuse to answer that question.
Did you ever stay all night with this man in Miami?
No.

Q. James stood back and shot Tommy Lee?
A. Yes.
Q. •And then Tommy Lee pulled out his gun and shot James
··in the fracas?
A. (After a hesitation) No sir, just above it.
Q. Doctor, did you say he wasshot in the woods?
A .. No, t said he was shot in the lumbar region.

Q. Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage
terminated?
A. By death.
Q. And by whose death was it terminated?

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Have yofi ever been arrested?
Yes.
What for?
Aggravating· a female.

Q. You say you're innocent, yet five people swore they saw
·
you steal a watch.
A. Your Honor, I can produce 500 people who didn't see me
steal it.
·
~-·~~~~,~~--

'

\. Q~When he went, had you gone and, . hact..she,·if she wanted
)
to fili(! wer~..~ble, for_)~g~.,timtr'5eing excluding all the
1-1
restramts on li~unot~o go also, would he have brought
J . you mearU.ng>you amf she. wi!li him to the station?
( ~.fvi;R···BROOKS. Objection. Thar'questi2.I1 ..should be taken
\.,_
.
out and shot.
'·
•d

•

0. What is vour name?
A. Ernestine McDowell.
Q. And what is your marital status?
A. Fair.

Q .. At the time you first saw Dr. McCarty, had you ever seen
him prior to that time?

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Are you married?
No, I'm divorced.
What did your husband do before you divorced him?
A lot of things that I didn't know about.

Q. Did the lady standing in the driveway subsequently identify
herself to you?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. Who did she say she was?
A. She said she was the owner of the dog's wife.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Do you know how far pregnant you are right now?
I will be three months November 8th.
Apparently then, the date of conception was August 8th?
Yes.
What were you and your husband doing at that time?

q.
fJI'
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Now I'm going to show you what has been marked as
State's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize the picture.
John Fletcher.
·
That's you?
Yes, sir.
And you were present when that picture was taken, right?

The primary vehicle for post-conviction relief following the
completion of the appellate process is a motion under 28
2255.

u.s.c.

§

The statute for the most part supplants the habeas corpus

petition for federal prisoners by providing a commensurate remedy
in the sentencing court.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated

that 2255, if it reaches the claim of error, must be used in
preference to habeas.

This is not considered to constitute an

unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 2255 provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside
or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
There are thus four grounds for relief:
1.

That the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States.
2.

That the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence.
3.

That the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law.
4.

That the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral

attack.
7

Generally, the failure to raise a non-constitutional or nonjurisdictional claim on direct appeal precludes assertion of the
claim in the collateral 2255 proceeding.

However, there are

exceptional circumstances where even a non-constitutional or nonjurisdictional error can result in a complete miscarriage of
justice, justifying collateral relief.

I'll give you an example

of exceptional circumstances in a little while.

With respect to

claims of constitutional or jurisdictional error, however, the
rule in the Second Circuit is that such claims may be raised in a
2255 proceeding, even if they were not raised on direct appeal.
There is an exception to this rule in the Second Circuit, but we
don't know what it is yet.

If you will examine Brennan v. United

States, 867 F.2d 111, 117 n.l (2d Cir. 1989), you will see that
we have not made up our collective minds as to whether the proper
standard for the exception is the deliberate bypass test or the
cause and prejudice test.

That's a loose end that one of you

will ask us to tie up in the near future.

For purposes of our

discussion, however, it suffices to say that constitutional and
jurisdictional errors generally can be raised by way of 2255 even
if not raised on the original direct appeal.

Brennan did not

involve such claims and went off on a failure to raise a statute
of limitations objection at trial and a failure to challenge the
characterization of the New York State Supreme Court as a RICO
enterprise on appeal.

As to the failure to object to the jury
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instruction on statute of limitations grounds at trial, Brennan
failed the cause and prejudice test applicable to trial error.
As to the failure to raise the enterprise question on appeal,
Brennan failed the exceptional circumstances test.
We found that the exceptional circumstances test was met in
Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988), and I refer you to
my opinion in that case for some detailed discussion of 2255.

In

Ingber, we found that 2255 properly was used to vacate a
conviction for mail fraud in light of the Supreme Court's
decision McNally v. United States.

The McNally holding

that

the mail fraud statute was limited to the protection of property
rights -- was decided after Ingber's conviction was affirmed.
McNally overruled long-established Second Circuit precedent that
deprivation of intangible rights not related to money or property
was punishable under the mail fraud statute.

Thus, those

convicted under our erroneous view of the mail fraud statute, 18
U.S.C.

§

1341, were convicted of conduct that was not a crime.

We held that the retroactive application of McNally was
necessary in order to avoid an unfair result, despite the fact
that Ingber had failed to present his challenge either on appeal
or in a petition for writ of certiorari.

The challenge of course

was not a constitutional one, and the time to file for certiorari
had expired well before our precedents were displaced by McNally.
The exceptional circumstances excusing the requirement for
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raising the claim on appeal obviously were the entrenched
precedents in relation to the scope of the mail fraud statute.
Appeal on the question of deprivation of intangible rights in a
mail fraud scheme would have been futile at the time of Ingber's
conviction.

We said:

Were we to penalize Ingber for failing to
challenge such entrenched precedent, we would
ascribe to attorneys and their clients the
power to prognosticate with greater precision
than the judges of this court. Such a rule
would encourage appeal of even well-settled
points of law.
Other circuits have followed us in using § 2255 to apply McNally
retroactively.
The following circumstances have been held to justify
challenges under § 2255 in this circuit:
A.

Where the indictment on its face fails to state a

federal offense.
B.

Where a guilty plea was based on an insufficient factual

foundation.
C.

Where a guilty plea was induced by a prosecutor's false

promise.
D.

Where counsel was not admitted to any bar, although the

disbarment of a defendant's counsel during a pretrial suppression
hearing was held not to require the vacation of a sentence where
the attorney ceased representation immediately upon learning of
the disbarment.
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E.

A claim of perjured testimony.

F.

The incompetency of the defendant at the time of court

proceedings.
G.

Where it was alleged that separate judgment of

conviction arose out of a single criminal transaction, raising
questions of double jeopardy.
H.

Where a claim of spillover effects of a double-jeopardy-

barred criminal charge was raised.
I.

Where the constitutional authority of a de facto judge

was challenged.
Where a motion addresses the execution of a sentence rather
than the legality of the conviction or the propriety of the
sentence imposed, relief is not available under

§

2255.

I

recently served on a panel that heard an appeal from the denial
of a 2255 motion made by a prisoner who sought correction of his
sentence on the claim that he was in custody during the time
spent in a hospital prior to sentencing.

In a summary order, we

held that review of the execution of appellant's sentence could
be obtained not by a 2255 motion but through a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§

2241.

Since the review by way of habeas

corpus could be had only in the court having jurisdiction over
appellant's custodian, we held that jurisdiction was lacking in
the Eastern District, the place of conviction.
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Rules and forms for proceeding under § 2255 have been
adopted by the Supreme Court.

They are found under the title,

"Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States
District Courts."

The procedural rules should be examined

carefully before making a 2255 motion.

After the motion is

filed, it is presented the judge who presided at the movant trial
and imposed sentence.

If the appropriate judge is unavailable,

it is presented to another judge of the same district court.

The

judge may either order the summary dismissal of the motion or
order the U.S. Attorney to answer.

Discovery is permitted, and

expanded record may be directed, and an evidentiary hearing may
be held.

If there is a hearing, counsel must be appointed under

the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act to represent an
indigent defendant.

If it appears that an evidentiary hearing is

not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the motion
as justice requires.
Section 2255 itself provides that the court "shall not be
required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar
relief on behalf of the same prisoner."

Consideration of

successive motions may be denied, however,

"only if (1) the same

ground presented in the subsequent application was determined
adversely to the applicant on the prior application,

(2) the

prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of
justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the
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subsequent application."
Although

§

2255 provides a means of remedy for a prisoner in

custody under sentence, the custody requirement has been read
liberally so that any conditions that significantly confine and
restrain will suffice.

Accordingly, custody has been found where

the defendant was released on his own recognizance after
conviction in state court; where the prisoner was discharged
while his motion was awaiting appellate review; and where the
movant was free on parole.

The critical moment in determining

custody is when the motion is filed.

The fact that a successful

collateral attack may not result in release from custody is no
bar to considering the motion.

As the rule provides, the movant

also must be under sentence for the conviction under attack.
An order entered under

§

2255 is appealable, and the time

limits for civil appeals apply.

Since the United States always

is a party, notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of the
entry of the district court's judgment.

The United States as

well as the movant may appeal.
Section 2255 provides an important and flexible tool for
achieving post-conviction, post-appeal relief.
your consideration.
I'm open for questions.
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I commend it to

FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
by

HON. ROGER J. MINER
United States Circuit Judge
Second Circuit Court of Appeals

May 12, 1989

FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

APPEALABILITY
I.

Final Judgment of Conviction Required
1.

Except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme

Court, appeals from all final decisions of the District Courts
must be prosecuted in the Courts of Appeals.
2.

28

u.s.c.

§ 1291.

The final decision in a criminal case is the final

judgment of conviction, a document signed by the Judge and
entered by the Clerk only after sentence is imposed.

See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32(b)(l); Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13
(1937).
3.

Congress intended to avoid piecemeal disposition of

criminal matters because "encouragement of delay is fatal to the
vindication of the criminal law."

Cobbledick v. United States,

309 U.S .. 323, 325 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.)..

"The rule of

finality has particular force in criminal prosecutions .. "

United

States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978).
4.

Appeals from nonfinal decisions will be dismissed sua

sponte for lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals.

In re

United States, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
962

(1978) ..

II.

Exceptions to the Final Judgment Requirement
1.

The collateral order doctrine has been developed to

permit defendants to appeal interlocutory orders in certain
limited circumstances:

The order must conclusively determine a

disputed question, resolve an issue completely separate from the
merits of the action and effectively be unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment.

Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259

(1984).
2.

Appeals under the collateral order doctrine have been

accepted for the purpose of reviewing the following:
(a) Denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on
grounds of double jeopardy.

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.

651, 662 (1977).
(b) Denial of a motion to dismiss under the speech and
debate clause of the Constitution.

Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S.

500, 507-08 (1979).
(c) Commitment for hospitalization pursuant to 18

u.s.c.

§ 424l(d)

because of mental incompetence to stand trial.

United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 238-39 C2d Cir. 1986).
(d) Order denying dismissal of an indictment where a
"colorable claim" of violation of a prior plea agreement is made.
United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1071 C2d Cir. 1985).
Ce) Decisions relating to bail.
U.S. 1, 6 (1951).

18

u.s.c.

§ 3145

2

Stack v. Boyle, 342

(Supp. II 1984) now provides for

the prompt determination of an appeal from a release or detention
order ..
(f) Pre-trial restraining orders under the forfeiture
provisions of the RICO and CCE Acts.

United States v. Gelb, 826

F.2d 1175 C2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d
1400 C2d Cir. 1988) Cin bane) ..
3.

Appeals under the collateral order doctrine have been

rejected for the purpose of reviewing the following:
(a) Disqualification of defense counsel.

Flanagan v.

United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
(b) Denial of motion to dismiss on grounds of
prosecutorial vindictiveness.

United States v. Hollywood Motor

Car Co., 458 U.S .. 263 (1982).
Cc) Denial of motion to dismiss on sixth amendment
speedy trial grounds.

United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850,

857 (1978).
(d) Continuances under the provisions of the Speedy
Trial Act.

United States v. Gurary, 793 F.2d 468 C2d Cir. 1986)

(extensions of time granted both to return an indictment and to
conduct a preliminary hearing).
Ce) Collateral protective order prohibiting defendant
from disclosing confidential documents made available to him by
government.

United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.

1986).
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(f) Denial of motion to dismiss indictment for alleged
grand jury abuses.

Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, No.

87-1905 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1989)

(LEXIS, Genfed library, US file).

(g) Order denying preindictment motion for return of
property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4l(e) if it is tied in any way to
a criminal prosecution in esse against movant.

Standard Drywall,

Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 927 (1982)

(grand jury investigation pending).

Compare

United States Postal Serv. v. C.E.C. Servs., No. 88-6196, slip.
op. at 1767-68 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 1989) (grand jury dismissed
without returning indictment).

III.

Appeals by the Government

1.

While the double jeopardy clause prohibits the appeal of

a judgment of acquittal, the government is provided a statutory
right to appeal as to certain matters in criminal cases.

u.s.c.

18

§ 3731 allows appeals from:

(a} Order dismissing an indictment or information or
granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or
more counts, except where the double jeopardy clause bars further
prosecution.
(b) Suppression or exclusion of evidence, where the
defendant has not been put in jeopardy, before the verdict or
finding, if the United States Attorney certifies that the appeal
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is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence
constitutes substantial proof of a material fact.
Cc)

Release of a person charged with or convicted of

an offense, or denial of a motion for revocation or modification
of conditions of release.

See also 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b)

(motion

for revocation or amendment of detention order).
2.

The government may appeal from the dismissal of a

portion of a count of an indictment only if the portion arguably
could have been set forth as a separate count.

United States v.

Tom, 787 F.2d 65, 77 C2d Cir. 1986).
3.

A pre-trial ruling denying the government's motion to

use certain evidence at trial is appealable by the government.
United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1987).
4.

Orders granting motions to suppress wiretap evidence or

denying wiretap applications are appealable if the United States
Attorney certifies that the appeal is not taken for purposes of
delay.

IV.

18 U.S.C. § 2518Cl0)(b).

Sentence
1.

Under the new sentencing provisions, both the government

and the defendant have the right to appeal to the Court of
Appeals for review of a final sentence.

18

u.s.c.

§

3742(a),

(b).

2.

An appeal of an otherwise final sentence imposed by a

Magistrate may be taken to the District Court as though the

5

appeal were to a Court of Appeals from the District Court.

u.s.c.
V.

18

§ 3742(f).

Appeal After Conditional Plea
1.

A defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or

nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to review the
adverse determination of any pre-trial motion on appeal from the
judgment.

The approval of the court and the consent of the

government is required for a conditional plea.

Fed. R. Crim. P.

11Ca){2).
2.

A defendant who prevails on appeal must be permitted to

withdraw the conditional plea.

Id.

MECHANICS OF APPEAL

I.

Pre-Appeal Proceedings in the District Court.
1.

The District Court must advise a defendant found guilty

after trial of the right to appeal and of the right to apply for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
2.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32{a)(2).

If the defendant so requests, the Clerk of the District

Court must prepare and file a Notice of Appeal on behalf of the
defendant.
3.

Id.

As to any defendant found guilty after trial, the

District Judge must complete and transmit to the Clerk of the

6

District Court for transmittal to the Court of Appeals "Form A,"
required by the Revised Second Circuit Plan To Expedite The
Processing Of Criminal Appeals (hereinafter "Plan"), containing,
inter alia, the following information:
(a) Sentencing data;
(b) Whether any transcripts were ordered during trial;
Cc) Whether defendant is eligible for appointment of
counsel on appeal pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act; whether
there is any reason that trial counsel should not be continued on
appeal; and whether the minutes of trial should be transcribed at
the expense of the government.
See Plan, sec. 1.

II.

The Notice of Appeal and Related Matters.
1.

The Notice of Appeal by a defendant is filed in the

District Court within ten days after the entry of the judgment or
order appealed from.

If filed before such entry, but after

announcement of a decision, sentence or order, the Notice of
Appeal is treated as filed on the date of entry.

Fed. R. App. P.

4 ( b) •

2.

An appeal from a judgment of conviction also may be

taken within ten days after the entry of an order denying a
timely motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial; if the
motion for new trial is made on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, the extension of time to appeal is conditioned on the
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making of the motion within ten days after the entry of judgment.
Id.
3.

A Notice of Appeal by the government is filed in the

District Court within thirty days after the entry of the judgment
or order appealed from;
docket.
4.

"entry" means entering in the criminal

Id.
The time for filing a Notice of Appeal may be extended

for thirty days, with or without a motion, by the District Court
"[u]pon a showing of excusable neglect • . . before or after the
time has expired."
5.

Id.

The filing fee ($5) and the docketing fee ($100) are

paid to the Clerk of the District Court.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1917;

Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (1987) (Judicial Conference
Schedule of Fees for the United States Courts of Appeals eff. May
1, 1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1913.
6.

The Clerk of the District Court serves notice of the

filing by mailing copies of the Notice of Appeal to counsel of
record for each party other than appellant.

In a case of an

appeal by a criminal defendant, the Clerk serves a copy of the
Notice of Appeal, either personally or by mail, upon the
defendant.
7.

Fed. R. App. P. 3(d).

The Clerk also has the duty to transmit copies of the

Notice of Appeal and the docket entries to the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals, who must promptly enter the appeal in the appropriate
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records.

Id.; Plan, sec. 2.

Court of Appeals docket.
8.

The appeal then is entered upon the

Fed. R. App. P. 12Ca).

At the time of filing the Notice of Appeal, counsel for

the appellant must furnish "Form B," required by the Plan, to the
Clerk of the District Court.

This form certifies that the

transcript has been ordered and satisfactory arrangements have
been made with the court reporter for payment of the cost of the
transcript.
9.

Plan, sec. 3.

When a transcript has been ordered, the court reporter

must notify the Clerk of the Court of Appeals "immediately" of
the estimated length of the transcript and the estimated date of
completion.
10.

Id., sec. 4.

The time for completion of the transcript "shall not

exceed thirty days from the order date except under unusual
circumstances which first must be approved by the Court of
Appeals upon a showing of need."

III.

Id.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
1.

As soon as possible after the Notice of Appeal is filed

in a criminal case, a scheduling order is issued in the Court of
Appeals providing:
(a) That the record on appeal be docketed within twenty
days after filing of the Notice of Appeal;
(b) That the brief and appendix of appellant be filed
not later than thirty days after the date on which the
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transcription of the trial minutes is scheduled to be completed,
unless a longer or shorter period is established for good cause
shown.
(c) That the Appellee's Brief be filed not later than
thirty days after the date on which Appellant's Brief and
Appendix are scheduled to be filed, unless a longer or shorter
period is fixed for good cause shown.
Cd) That the argument will be heard during the week
designated in the order.
Plan, sec. 5.
2.

Although not referred to in the Plan, a Reply Brief may

be filed and served by an appellant within fourteen days after
service of the Brief of the Appellee.

Except for good cause

shown, a Reply Brief must be filed at least three days before
argument.
3.

Fed. R. App. P. 3l(a).
The Court of Appeals may enter any other orders deemed

desirable for prompt disposition of appeals.
orders:

These include

appointing counsel on appeal; setting date for filing

transcriptions of trial minutes; requiring attorneys for
co-appellants to share a copy of the transcript; and instructing
the Clerk to permit counsel to remove and examine the record.
Plan, sec. 6.
4.

The record on appeal consists of the original papers and

exhibits filed in the District Court, any transcript of
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proceedings, and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared
by the Clerk of the District Court.
5.

Fed. R. App. P. lO(a).

The record on appeal must be filed by the date fixed in

the scheduling order.

See supra III.l.(a).

Motions to extend

time to file the record ordinarily will not be granted.

If the

transcript is incomplete, the record should be filed and
supplemented upon completion of the transcript.
6.

Plan, sec. 5(a).

Each appellant is required to take such action as may be

necessary "to enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the
record .. "
7.

Fed.. R. App.. P. 11 (a) ..
Any differences of the parties with respect to whether

the record discloses what occurred in the District Court must be
settled by the District Court.

Also, the Court of Appeals may

direct that omissions or misstatements be corrected and may order
a supplemental record to be certified and transmitted.

Fed. R.

App .. P. 10 ( e ) .
8.

Section 11 of the Second Circuit Rules Supplementing

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "Supp. Rules")
urges the parties to agree as to the exhibits necessary for the
determination of the appeal.

Failing that, each party may

designate the exhibits considered necessary, and all
non-designated exhibits remain with the District Court Clerk
unless requested by the Court of Appeals.

The Rule does not

relieve the parties of their obligations with respect to
preparation of the Appendix under Supp. Rule § 30.
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IV..

Motions

I.

The time and manner of making motions are governed by

Supp. Rule § 27.

Notice of Motion Form T-1080 must be employed,

and a copy of the lower court decision must accompany the
affidavits, memoranda of law and exhibits.

Supp. Rule §

27(a)(l)-(2) ..
2.

Substantive motions normally are heard by the regular

panels sitting on Tuesday of each week, and oral argument is
permitted.

A single judge may hear substantive motions when the

court is in recess.
3.

Id .. § 27(b), (f) ..

On a motion for release pending appeal:
(a) Appellant must demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence that he or she is not likely to flee or pose a danger to
the safety of any other person or the community if released.
18

u.s.c.

§ 3143

(b)(l).

(b) Appellant also must demonstrate that the appeal is
not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of
law or fact likely to result in reversal, new trial or a sentence
that does not involve imprisonment.

Id.§ 3143(b)(2).

A

"substantial" question is one that is "close" or could very well
be decided the other way; it is more than non-frivolous.

United

States v. Randell, 761 F.2d 122, 125 C2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S .. 1008 (1985) ..
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(c) An application for release after conviction must be
made in the District Court in the first instance.

Fed. R. App.

P. 9Cb).
Cd> No appeal lies from district court's presentence
denial of bail pending appeal of sentence.

United States v.

Friedman, 813 F.2d 579 C2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
4.

A sentence of imprisonment may be stayed if a defendant

is released pending appeal.
may be stayed pending appeal.

Sentences of fine or probation also
Fed. R. Crim. P. 38; Fed. R. App.

P. 8(c).
5.

Procedural Motions generally are determined by a single

judge without oral argument.

Supp. Rule§ 27(f).

Motions for

leave to file oversized briefs, to postpone the date for filing
briefs or to change the date of argument must be made not less
than seven days before the brief is due or the argument is
scheduled, in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

"Motions

to postpone the dates set for filing briefs or for argument are
not viewed with favor and will be granted only under
extraordinary c1rcumstances."

Plan, sec. 9.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

I.

Errors of Fact
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1.

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting conviction, the defendant "bears a very heavy burden."
United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir. 1983).
2.

A guilty verdict must be sustained if "any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979).
3.

In

app~als

by defendants, "[p]ieces of evidence must be

viewed not in isolation but in conjunction, and the reviewing
court must draw all favorable inferences and resolve all issues
of credibility in favor of the prosecution."

United States v.

Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1986).
4.

The claim of insufficiency of evidence generally is

preserved for appeal by a motion for a judgment of acquittal made
at the close of all the evidence.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29;

United States v. Kaplan, 586 F.2d 980, 982 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978).

5.

A District Court's finding of consent to search will not

be set aside unless clearly erroneous.

United States v.

Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 57 C2d Cir. 1988).
6.

Although the general rule is that a District Court's

findings of fact may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous,
see United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 495 C2d Cir. 1988)

(per

curiam), the Court of Appeals must examine the entire record and
make an independent determination of the issue of voluntariness
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when the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is
claimed.
7.

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).

If a trial court's finding is sustained by the evidence

as to a question of fourth amendment custody, "[t]he court of
appeals [is] mistaken in substituting for that finding its view
of the evidence."
(1980)

(plurality).

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557
But see United States v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d

42, 46-47 & n.l (2d Cir. 1987).

II.

Errors of Law
1.

Admission or exclusion of evidence is not error unless a

party's substantial rights are affected and (1) a specific
objection is made in cases of admission or (2) an offer of proof
is made in cases of exclusion.
2.

Fed. R. Evid. 103(a).

Giving or failing to give an instruction to a jury may

not be assigned as error unless specific objection is made before
the jury retires.
3.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.

"An appellate court can reverse the determination below

for mere error in law, and does not apply the clearly erroneous
standard in reviewing determinations of law."

2 Fed. Proc. L.

Ed. § 3:652.
4.

Errors not affecting substantial rights are to be

disregarded.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)

Charmless error rule).

An

error not objected to at the trial level will not be considered
on appeal unless it falls into the "plain error" category.
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See

United States v. Calfon, 607 F.2d 29, 30 C2d Cir. 1979)

(per

curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980).
5.

Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may

be noticed on appeal although they were not called to the
attention of the trial court.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

error must go to the very essence of the case.

Plain

Calfon, 607 F.2d

at 31.
6.

Constitutional error can be regarded as harmless only

where it can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1970), although some
constitutional errors involve rights so important as to require
automatic reversal, see,

~,

Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323,

331 (1970) (double jeopardy).

7.

An abuse of discretion standard has been applied to

review district court decisions relating to the following:
severance, consolidation, continuance, change of venue, and
motion to withdraw guilty plea.
~·i

see,

Cir. 1982)

~,

9 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. § 22:1303 et

United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d

(continuance), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).

APPELLATE ADVOCACY

I.

The Brief
1.

The Brief must contain, in the following order:

Cl) a table of contents, with page references, and a table of
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cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes and other authorities,
referring to the page where they are cited; (2) a statement of
the issues presented;

(3) a statement of the nature of the case,

the course of proceedings and the disposition below, followed by
a statement of facts with references to the record;

(4) an

argument containing contentions, reasons and citations to
authorities and the record;
sought.

(5) a conclusion stating the relief

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)-(c).

Appellant's Brief must

include, as a preliminary statement, the name of the Judge who
rendered the decision and a citation to the opinion, if reported.
Supp. Rule§ 28(2).

The form of the Brief is prescribed by Fed.

R. App. P. 32 and Supp. Rule § 32.
2.

Except by permission of the Court, principal Briefs

cannot exceed fifty pages and Reply Briefs cannot exceed
twenty-five pages, exclusive of pages containing the tables and
any addendum containing statutes, rules and regulations.
App. P. 28(f), (g).

3.

Fed. R.

Excessive footnoting should be avoided.

If pertinent authorities come to the attention of the

party after the Brief is filed or after oral argument but before
decision, that party should promptly advise the Court by letter,
with a copy to opposing counsel, setting forth the citations.
Fed • R.. App . P .. 2 8 ( j ) .

4.

Parties should be referred to in the Brief by name or

description rather than "appellant" or "appellee."
P ..

28(d).
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Fed. R. App.

5.

Some deficiencies noted:

excessive quotation of the

record and authorities; inaccurate citations; typographical and
grammatical errors; outdated authorities; disorganized arguments;
failure to identify and distinguish adverse precedent; lack of
clarity; prolix sentences; uninformative point headings;
inadequate statement of the issues presented; incomplete factual
presentation; statement of the facts through summary of witness•
testimony rather than narrative; discussion of material outside
the record; use of slang; inclusion of sarcasm, personal attacks
and other irrelevant matters; excessive_ number of points; lack of
reasoned argument; illogical and unsupportable conclusions;
failure to meet adversary's arguments; failure to recognize that
the purpose of the Brief is to persuade.· See Supp. Rule§ 28(1).

II.

The Appendix
1.

The appellant is responsible for preparing and filing

the Appendix to the Briefs.

It must contain:

Cl) the docket

entries in the proceeding below; (2) relevant portions of the
pleadings, charge, findings or opinion; (3) the judgment, order
or decision in question;

(4) other parts of the record to which

the parties wish to direct the Court's attention.

Generally,

memoranda of law filed below should not be included.
App. P. 30(a).

Fed. R.

The form of the Appendix is governed by Fed. R.

App. P. 32.
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2.

The parties are encouraged to agree on the contents of

the Appendix.

If they cannot, the appellant must serve on the

appellee a designation of the parts of the record to be included
and a statement of the issues to be presented, within ten days
after the filing of the record.

The appellee then must designate

the portions of the record it desires to include, within ten days
thereafter, and the appellant must include the parts so
designated.
3.

Fed. R. App. P. 30(b).

Unless the parties otherwise agree, the cost of

producing the Appendix must be paid initially by appellant.

If

the appellant considers the items designated by appellee
unnecessary, the appellee must be so advised and must then
advance the costs of including those items.

The cost of

production is taxed as costs, except that the cost of producing
unnecessary items may be imposed on the requesting party.

Local

rules may provide for sanctions to be imposed upon "attorneys who
unreasonably and vexatiously increase the costs of litigation
through the inclusion of unnecessary material in the appendix."
Id.

(Although the Second Circuit has not yet adopted such a

rule, these sanctions have been imposed under the Court's
inherent powers.)
4.

An alternative method, allowing for deferred preparation

of the Appendix, is provided, and the Appendix may be dispensed
with altogether in appeals conducted under the Criminal Justice
Act.

Fed. R. App. P. 30(c); Supp. Rule§ 30.
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When exhibits are

designated for inclusion, they may be bound in a separate volume,
suitably indexed with a description of each exhibit.

Fed. R.

App. P. 30(e); Supp. Rule§ 30.
5.

Preparation of an appropriate Appendix is an important

factor in successful appellate advocacy.
as serious a deficiency as overinclusion.

Underinclusion is just
Frequently, Briefs

refer to matters in the record that are not included in the
Appendix.

III.

This creates an unfavorable impression on the Court.

Oral Argument
1.

Although the Court is authorized to dispense with oral

argument in certain cases, Supp. Rule§ 34(g), the custom in the
Second Circuit is to allow it whenever requested.

Time requests

are passed on by the presiding judge, and the time currently
allowed to each side averages ten to fifteen minutes.
may reserve time for rebuttal.
three judges.

Appellant

Argument is heard by a panel of

Once a case is set for oral argument, there may be

no continuance, except by order of the Court on good cause shown.
Fed. R. App. P. 34.

Engagement of counsel (other than in the

Supreme Court) is not good cause.

Supp. Rule § 34.

Oral argument is a very important element of appellate
advocacy and should not be waived.

It presents an important

opportunity to persuade the Court.

The Second Circuit is a "hot

bench" and the judges welcome the opportunity to clarify their
thinking and that of their colleagues through the interchange
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with counsel.

A judge's tentative conclusions about a case have

been "turned around" on many occasions by oral argument.
3.

Some deficiencies noted:

reading from a prepared text;

quoting extensively from a case or from the record; deferring
answers to questions; referring to the Brief rather than
responding directly to the inquiry; lack of preparation; lack of
familiarity with precedential cases decided since the filing of
the Briefs; excessive discussion of the facts; lack of
familiarity with relevant facts; unnecessary discussion of basic
legal principles; unfamiliarity with cases cited; responding with
a "guess"; lack of a structured argument; ineffective
presentation of the issues; insufficient voice volume;
distracting mannerisms; answering questions with questions;
attempting to cover too many points; emotional arguments.

IV.

Sanctions
1.

The sanction of dismissal may be imposed for failure to

comply with time limitations or any rule or order related to the
appeal.

Supp. Rule § 38; Plan, sec. 11.

DECISION MAKING

I.

Initial decision making
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1.

The median time for processing criminal appeals in the

Second Circuit is 6 months, the fastest in the nation.
Second Circuit Report 1988, at 7.

See

A decision may come in the

form of a written opinion or a summary order.

Decisions may be

announced from the bench, but such dispositions are rare, except
in the case of argued motions.
opinions and are unreported.

Summary orders are not formal
Since they are considered to serve

"no jurisprudential purpose," they may not be cited or otherwise
referred to in unrelated cases before the Second Circuit or any
other court.

Rules Relating to the Organization of the Court §

0.23.
2.

Tentative votes are taken at conferences held

immediately following oral argument or at the end of the week.
Voting memoranda, giving reasons for the tentative votes, are
exchanged in a number of cases.

Writing assignments are made by

the senior active judge, unless that judge dissents, in which
case the assignment is made by the next senior active judge.
Drafts of opinions and summary orders undergo extensive review by
panel members, and positions frequently are re-aligned.

Summary

orders generally are not used in cases of reversal, and any
panel member may object to decision by summary order.
3.

Following receipt of the opinion or order, the Clerk

enters judgment and, on the same date, mails copies of the
opinion or orders to the parties.

Fed. R. App. P. 36.

The

mandate issues twenty-one days thereafter, "unless the time is
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shortened or enlarged by order . "

Fed .. R .. App. P .. 41 (a)..

See

Plan, sec . 13 ..

II.

Post-judgment decision making
1.

The decision-making process may continue with a petition

to the panel for rehearing, which must be filed within fourteen
days after entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or
enlarged by order.

The petition must particularize the points of

law or fact petitioner contends were overlooked or misapprehended
in the opinion.

Oral argument ordinarily is not permitted, and

no answer to the petition will be received unless the court so
requires.
2.

Fed. R. App. P. 40;

~also

Supp. Rule § 40.

The petition for rehearing may also contain a

"suggestion" for rehearing in bane.

The vote of a majority of

the Circuit Judges in regular active service is necessary to
secure in bane consideration.

An appeal or other proceeding may

be heard in bane initially, but in bane hearings generally are
disfavored.

They are limited to cases where consideration by the

full Court is necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions and
where questions of exceptional importance are involved.

Fed. R.

App. P. 35; Supp. Rule §
3.

Issuance of the mandate is stayed upon timely filing of

a petition for rehearing.

If the petition is denied, the mandate

issues seven days thereafter.

A further stay may be sought by

motion on notice pending application for writ of certiorari to
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the U.S. Supreme Court.

Fed. R. App. P. 41; Supp. Rule § 41.

The pendency of a suggestion for rehearing in bane does not
automatically stay the mandate.

Fed. R. App. P. 35(c).
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POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
1.

Conviction defined

A criminal conviction occurs at the entering of the judgment
of conviction, a document setting forth the plea, the verdict or
findings and the adjudication and sentence.

See Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(b)(l).

2.

Postconviction relief may be sought through:
(a)

certain mechanisms available preconviction as well as
postconviction:
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (new trial in interests of
justice,·e.g., newly discovered evidence;
available on motion of defendant only and subject
to brief time limit);
Fed. R. Crim. P. 34 (arrest of judgment, e.g., if
indictment or information does not charge an
offense, or if no jurisdiction over offense
charged; on motion of defendant only and also
subject to short time limit);
Fed R. Crim. P. 36 (clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of record; motion
may be brought at any time);

(b)

motion for correction of sentence for changed
circumstances, brought by government to reflect a
defendant's subsequent substantial assistance in
investigation or prosecution of another.
P. 35(b).

Subject to one-year time limit.

Fed R. Crim.
Id.;

(c)

a timely appeal:
28 U.S.C. § 3731 regulates appeals by government
of a criminal decision, judgment or order, the
appeal of which must not violate double jeopardy;
28 U.S.C. § 3742 provides that appeal of sentence
may be taken by defendant or government to court
of appeals from the district court, or to district
court from a magistrate;

(d)

petition for coram nobis (seeking relief from factual
error) under the "All Writs" statute, 28

u.s.c.

§165l(a), available before or after petitioner is in
federal custody, see Thomas v. United States, 271 F.2d
500 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (before); Chin v. United States,
622 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1980) (after), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 923 (1981), or while petitioner is serving a
sentence for a subsequent state conviction, United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954);
(e)

an application for habeas corpus, see 28

u.s.c.

§

2241-

2242, by one in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state court, id. § 2254, or otherwise in custody; or

(f)

a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

3.

Habeas corpus and section 2255 compared:
(a)

Similarities:
Section 2255 affords federal prisoners a remedy
identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.
2

Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974).
Habeas corpus literally means "you have the body,"
and the writs are used to gain release from
unlawful custody.
Proceeding by writ of habeas corpus or by motion
pursuant to section 2255 is not attack on the
conviction but on the validity of the detention
and is, therefore, a collateral proceeding rather
than an appeal.

Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708,

711 (1961); United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34,
41 (2d Cir. 1984).
Unlike direct review, a collateral attack may be
made at any time, Dukes, 727 F.2d at 41, subject
to the "deliberate delay" doctrine, see Brennan v.
United States, 867 F.2d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1989).
(b)

Differences:
Section 2255 was enacted "to minimize the
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings
by affording the same rights in another more
convenient forum."

United States v. Hayman, 342

U.S. 206, 219 (1952).
Whereas an application for habeas corpus is
directed to the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, a district court, or any circuit judge,
within their respective jurisdictions, 28 U.S.C.
§§

2241-2242, and jurisdiction in the first
3

instance normally lies in the district court where
the prisoner is in custody, see generally 16
Federal Procedure

§§

41:53-41:65, at 350-56 (L.

Ed. 1983) (hereafter Fed. Proc.), a motion under
section 2255 is directed to the court that imposed
the sentence sought to be vacated, set aside, or
corrected, 28

u.s.c.

§

2255.

(An application

under section 2255 usually should be made to the
sentencing judge, but where that "might
unnecessarily complicate and delay adjudication of
a petitioner's substantial mainstream claims," it
may be made to another judge in the same court.
Papadakis v. Warden of MCC, 822 F.2d 240, 245 (2d
Cir. 1987).)

Section 2255 provides the exclusive remedy for a
federal prisoner to attack a sentence, Dukes, 727
F.2d at 40 n.4, except that "where the Section
2255 procedure is shown to be 'inadequate or
ineffective,' the Section provides that habeas
corpus shall remain open to afford the necessary
hearing," Hayman, 342 U.S. at 223 (quoting§
2255).

The circumstances under which section 2255

could be inadequate, however, are virtually
nonexistent.
Procedure

§

See C. Wright, 3 Federal Practice &
591, at 426-28 (2d ed. 1982)

(hereafter Fed. Pract.).
4

There are circumstances outside of the scope of
section 2255 where a writ for habeas corpus may be
used, such as where the sentence itself is not at
issue (e.g., where the challenge is to revocation
of parole, or to the manner in which the sentence
is being executed, or where one is confined
without judgment or held beyond the expiration of
sentence) or where one is committed for mental
incompetency.

See 3 id.

§

591, at 425-26.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
explicitly provided for in the Constitution.
U.S. Const. art. 1,

§

See

9, cl. 2.

In contrast with section 2255, section 2254 of 28
U.S.C. regulates any habeas action brought in
federal court by a prisoner in custody pursuant to
a state court judgment.

See 28

u.s.c.

§

2254.

For any habeas proceeding in federal court,
whether or not brought under section 2254,
jurisdictional power is conferred by section 2241.
See 16 Fed. Proc. § 41:40, at 345.
4.

Scope of section 2255 collateral proceedings
(a)

Four grounds for relief:
"that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States";
"that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence";
5

"that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law";
that the sentence "is otherwise subject to
collateral attack."

Hill v. United States, 368

U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962).
(b)

Like habeas corpus, section 2255 requires "exceptional
circumstances" -- i.e., an error that is either
"jurisdictional," "constitutional," fundamentally
defective in that it "inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice," or "an omission inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure."

Hill,

368 U.S. at 428.
5.

Sufficient grounds for section 2255
(a)

Where indictment on its face fails to state a federal
offense.

Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879, 881-82

(2d Cir. 19.87).
(b)

Where guilty plea was based on insufficient factual
basis, see Montgomery v. United States, 853 F.2d 83,
85-86 (2d Cir. 1988), or was induced by prosecutor's
false promise, see United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d
445, 448 (2d Cir. 1951).

(c)

Right to counsel, e.g., where chosen counsel was not
admitted to any bar, Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d
160 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Waterhouse v. Rodriquez, 848
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1988)

(disbarment of defendant's

counsel during pretrial suppression hearing did not
6

require vacation of sentence where attorney ceased
representation immediately upon learning of
disbarment).
(d)

Claim of perjured testimony.

United States v.

Barillas, 291 F.2d 743, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1961).
(e)

Competency of defendant at time of court proceedings.
See Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
1976) (per curiam).

(f)
6.

See also§ 7(a) infra (constitutional claims).

Insufficient grounds for section 2255
(a)

Where guilty plea was induced by statutory provision
subsequently invalidated.

United States v. Bass, 477

F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
(b)

Attorney performance not falling below a standard of
reasonably effective assistance.

See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
(c)

Request for sentence credit.

See United States v.

Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Courts
have original jurisdiction only over the imposition of
[federal] sentence, not over its computation.").
7.

Constitutional claim
(a)

Found to be constitutional:
where alleged that separate judgments of
conviction arose out of single criminal
transaction, raising questions of double jeopardy.
Grimes v. United States, 607 F.2d 6, 9-11 (2d Cir.
7

1979) ..
claim of spillover effects of double-jeopardybarred criminal charge.

Pacelli v. United States,

588 F.2d 360, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 908 (1979).
constitutional authority of de facto judge.
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 706-07 (2d
Cir. 1962).
composition of grand jury; however, where
objection is untimely, claim will be procedurally
barred unless cause is shown and prejudice would
result from denying claim.

Davis v. United

States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
(b)

Found to be nonconstitutional (see§ 11 infra):
statute of limitations affirmative defense.
Brennan, 867 F.2d at 117 n.l.
interpretation of term in statute.

Id.

("enterprise" in RICO statute) ..
credibility of witnesses.

Norris v. United

States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982).
8.

Exceptional circumstances found where:
(a)

Subsequent change in law resulting in petitioner's
"conviction and punishment [having been imposed] for an
act that the law does not make criminal."
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974).

Davis v.
This rule

applies even where petitioner failed to raise the issue
8

in the direct appeal, perhaps not having thought of the
argument that was not yet law, or having decided not to
challenge well-settled precedent.

See Ingber v. Enzor,

841 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1988).
9.

Custody and sentence requirement
(a)

Section 2255 provides a means of remedy for "a prisoner
in custody under sentence."

This custody requirement

has been read liberally, 3 Fed. Pract.

§

596, at 468,

so that any conditions that significantly confine and
restrain will suffice, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236, 243 (1963).
(b)

Custody found where:
defendant released on his own recognizance after
conviction in state court.

Hensley v. Municipal

Court, 411 U.S. 234 (1973) (habeas corpus action);
prisoner discharged while petition awaiting
appellate review.

Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S.

234 (1968) (habeas corpus action);
petitioner free on parole.

Argro v. United

States, 505 F.2d 1374, 1375 n.l (2d Cir. 1974).
(c)

The critical moment in determining custody is when the
section 2255 motion is filed.

3 Fed. Pract.

§

596, at

470.
(d)

Fact that successful collateral attack may not result
in release from custody is no bar to considering
section 2255 motion.

Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
9

(1968)

(challenge to sentence due to take effect at

termination of current sentence); Walker v. Wainwright,
390 U.S. 335 (1968) (separate sentence due to take
effect at termination of challenged sentence); Grimes,
607 F.2d at 8-9 (challenge to one basis of single
general sentence).
(e)

As the rule states, the petitioner also must be under
sentence for the conviction attacked.

10.

Id. at 7.

Hearing
(a)

Section 2255 and Rule 4(b) governing the section, see

§

13 infra, provides that if the motion, file and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief, a hearing is unnecessary.

See

Garcia Montalvo v. United States, 862 F.2d 425, 426-27
(2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Williams v. United States,
503 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1974).

The determination

lies within the discretion of the district court,
Williams, 5.03 F. 2d at 998, notwithstanding the
government's consent to a hearing, id.
(b)

Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must be liberally
construed.

See Elliott v. Bronson, No. 88-2242, slip.

op. at 2561 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 1989) (per curiam).
(c)

Petitioner need not be produced at every section 2255
hearing.

Hayman, 342 U.S. at 222.

However, where

"there are substantial issues of facts as to events in
which the prisoner participated, the trial court should
10

require his production for a hearing."

Id.;

also

Paglia, 190 F.2d at 448.
11.

Procedural defaults
(a)

Petitioner may be barred from raising a claim under
section 2255 because of a failure to assert the claim
at trial or on direct appeal.
The nature of the claim may be determinative
whether it is: (a) constitutional or
jurisdictional; or (b) nonconstitutional and
nonjurisdictional.

See, e.g., Brennan, 867 F.2d

at 117 & n.1.
Depending on the nature of the claim and the
procedural default, two tests have been used to
determine whether the claim may be heard by way of
section 2255: (a)

"deliberate bypass" -- i.e.,

whether the failure to raise the issue in earlier
proceedings was a deliberate strategic decision,
see United States v. West, 494 F.2d 1314 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974); and (b)
cause and prejudice -- i.e., whether petitioner
can show good cause for the procedural default and
prejudice resulting from not being allowed to
raise the issue by section 2255, see United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
The deliberate bypass test is the narrower
exception and its application will bar fewer
11

section 2255 claims than will application of the
cause and prejudice test.

See Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977).
(b)

Test for constitutional or jurisdictional claims:
There is an open question in the Second Circuit
whether the "deliberate bypass" test remains the
proper standard for foreclosing constitutional and
jurisdictional issues not raised on direct appeal,
or whether the "good cause and prejudice" test
applies.

(c)

See Brennan, 867 F.2d at 117 n.1.

Test for nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional
claims.
A failure to object at trial forecloses review,
subject to petitioner's satisfying the cause and
prejudice test. Id. at 119 (statute of limitations
affirmative defense not raised at trial).
As a general rule, the failure to raise a
nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional claim on
direct review precludes assertion of the claim in
a collateral proceeding.

Id. at 117, 120.

In "exceptional circumstances," however, even a
nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional error can
result in a "complete miscarriage of justice,"
justifying collateral relief.

Id. at 117, 121;

see Ingber, 841 F.2d at 454.
(d)

The failure of counsel to take an appeal when requested
12

to do so may itself be ground for section 2255 review.
See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969).
(e)

Effect of plea:
After judgment on plea of guilty, defendant may
not raise under section 2255 nonjurisdictional
challenges.

Hayle, 815 F.2d at 881.

Any

jurisdictional defect must be apparent from the
face of the indictment.
12.

Id. at 881-82.

Time for 2255 motion
(a)

The "motion for . . . relief may be made at any time."
28

(b)

u.s.c.

§

2255.

There must be a sentence imposed on the complained-of
conviction in order to confer jurisdiction for
collateral attack.

(c)

Grimes, 607 F.2d at 7.

Neither laches, Pacelli, 588 at 360, nor any statute of
limitations applies to the making of a section 2255
motion.

(d)

3 Fed. Pract.

§

597, at 480.

Nevertheless, delays can be taken into account by the
court ruling on section 2255 motion.

Pacelli, 588 F.2d

at 365.
(e)

Rule 9(a) of the Section 2255 Rules provides that the
motion may be dismissed if delay caused the government
to be prejudiced in its ability to respond, unless the
movant shows that the motion "is based on grounds of
which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise
of reasonable diligence before the circumstances
13

prejudicial to the government occurred."
Rule 9(a).

Section 2255

"It is the government's ability to respond

to the motion, not its ability to retry the defendant
successfully, that is relevant."

3 Fed. Pract. § 597,

at 482.
(f)

Delay may be disregarded, however, where (1) there is a
change in law or new evidence, and (2) the interests of
justice would be served and the petitioner makes a
proper showing why a particular ground for relief was
not asserted.

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(a) of

the Habeas Corpus Rules (incorporated by reference in
Note to Rule 9(a) of the Section 2255 Rules -- see

§

13

infra).
(g)

A new rule of criminal procedure formulated after
conviction is final generally is not to be applied
retroactively, except where the new rule either "places
'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe'" or "requires the observance of 'those
procedures that . . . are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."'"
1073 (1989)

13.

Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060,

(citations omitted).

Procedure
Rules and Forms have been adopted by the Supreme Court to
govern proceedings under section 2255.

See Rules Governing

Proceedings in the United States District Courts Under
14

Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code ("Section 2255
Rules").
14.

Mislabeling: labels not decisive
(a)

Mislabeled as petition for habeas corpus, treated as
2255 motion.

(b)

Dukes, 727 F.2d at 40 n.4.

Mislabeled as petition for coram nobis, treated as 2255
motion.

United States v. Little, 608 F.2d 296, 299

(8th 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980).
(c)

Mislabeled as petition under 2255, treated as coram
nobis petition.

United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d

659, 662 (2d Cir. 1976).
15.

Appellate Review of 2255 motions
(a)

Section 2255 itself provides that an order under
section 2255 is appealable.

(b)

Time limits for civil appeals apply.

Section 2255 Rule

11; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4
(1952); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
(c)

Because the United States is a party to all section
2255 proceedings, notice of appeal must be filed within
60 days of entry of the district court's order.
R. App. 4(a).

Fed.

The United States also may appeal.

See

Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1963);
Bonfiglio v. Hadden, 770 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1985).
However, section 2255 cannot be "staged" in form to
circumvent a prohibition on government appellate
rights.

United States v. Hundley, 858 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
15

1988).
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